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Abstract.  
Experiments were conducted to test several hypotheses on methods for improving docu-
ment classification for the malicious insider threat problem within the Intelligence Com-
munity. Bag-of-words (BOW) representations of documents were compared to Natural 
Language Processing (NLP) based representations in both the typical and one-class clas-
sification problems using the Support Vector Machine algorithm. Results show that the 
NLP features significantly improved classifier performance over the BOW approach both 
in terms of precision and recall, while using many fewer features. The one-class algo-
rithm using NLP features demonstrated robustness when tested on new domains.     
1 Introduction 
This paper reports on further developments in the research [1, 2] that leverages Natu-
ral Language Processing (NLP) and Machine Learning (ML) technologies to improve 
one aspect of security within the Intelligence Community (IC). This would be done 
by monitoring insiders’ workflow documents and alerting the system assurance ad-
ministrator if the content of the documents shifts away from what is expected, given 
the insiders’ assignments. This capability is being implemented as one piece of a tri-
partite system prototype within the context of the ARDA-funded project, A Context, 
Role and Semantic-based Approach for Countering Malicious Insider [3]. In particu-
lar, we evaluate the applicability of a one-class categorization algorithm - Support 
Vector Machines (SVM) - which, unlike a regular classifier, is trained on ‘typical’ 
examples only and then used to detect both ‘typical’ and ‘atypical’ data. This is war-
ranted by the context of the problem where the potential subject domain of interest to 
the malicious insider is unknown in advance and, therefore, it is not feasible to pro-
vide ‘off-topic’ examples to train a classifier.  
2 Problem Background 
It is known from Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from the IC that analysts operate 
within a mission-based context, focused mainly on specific topics of interest (TOIs) 
and geo-political areas of interest (AOIs). The information accessed by analysts 
ranges from news articles to analyst reports, official documents, emails, queries, and 
the role and the task assigned to the analyst dictates the scope of their TOI/AOI. 
Within this mission-focused context, our hypothesis is that the ML-based text catego-
rization of documents produced by the NLP-based semantic analysis of texts will en-
able a system to measure the extent to which an insider’s document workflow is 
within the scope of the assigned task, in terms of TOI and AOI.  
To illustrate the problem, consider the following “Threat Scenario”, which is one 
of the six developed by the project team, based on a review of known malicious in-
sider cases and consultations with the IC. An analyst with appropriate security clear-
ance works on problems dealing with the Biological Weapons Program (TOI) in Iraq 
(AOI). For some reason, the analyst begins collecting information on ballistic mis-
siles in North Korea. Since the topic is beyond his assigned task, these actions are 
covert, interspersed with his ‘normal’, ‘on-topic’ communications. Now and then he 
would query a database and retrieve documents on North Korea’s missiles; occasion-
ally, he would send a question to another analyst from the North Korea shop and re-
ceive documents via email; to pass the information to his external partners, he would 
copy data to a CD or print documents out. As these actions involve such textual arti-
facts as documents, database queries, and emails, analysis of their semantic content 
should be indicative of which topics are of interest to the analyst. Further comparison 
of these topics to what is expected, given the analyst’s task, would reveal whether 
they are beyond the expected scope. 
In addition to monitoring insider’s communications, semantic analysis can be run 
ex-post-facto, if an information assurance engineer grew suspicious of an individual. 
Alternatively, it can help quickly characterize large collections of documents by sepa-
rating them into semantic-driven categories for a wide range of applications.  
It is important to note that the system will not replace human supervisors, but assist 
them by reducing the data to analyze to just the detected ‘anomalies’.  
3 Related Work 
Until recently, the problem of detecting malicious insider activity was mainly ap-
proached from the cyber security standpoint, with systems as the main object of po-
tential attack [4, 5]. The 2003 and 2004 Symposia on Intelligence and Security In-
formatics (ISI) demonstrated an increased appreciation of information as an important 
factor of national security. As information is often represented through textual arti-
facts, linguistic analysis has been applied to the problems of cyber security. Sreenath 
[6] showed how reconstruction of users’ queries from their online logs with latent 
semantic analysis can be applied to detect malicious intent. Studies also looked at lin-
guistic indicators of deception in interview transcripts [7], email messages [8], and 
online chat [9]. Bengel [10] applied classification algorithms to the task of chat topic 
detection.  
Another line of text classification research addresses situations when providing 
‘negative’ examples for training is not feasible, for example, in intrusion detection 
[11], adaptive information filtering [12, 13], and spam filtering [14]. Recently, re-
search effort has focused on application of a one-class categorization algorithm, 
which is trained on positive examples only and then tested on the data that contain 
both positive and negative examples. Conceptually, the task is to acquire all possible 
knowledge about one class and then apply it to identify examples that do not belong 
to this class. As the one-class Support Vector Machines (SVM) [15] was shown to 
outperform other algorithms [12, 13, 16], it was chosen for our experiments. The 
novelty of our approach is in evaluating its effectiveness on various sets of features 
selected to represent documents. In particular, we compared the BOW representation 
with different combinations of linguistic features generated using NLP techniques. 
4 Proposed Solution 
The task of identifying ‘off–topic’ documents is modeled as a text categorization 
problem. Categorization models of expected topics are first built from the semantic 
content of a given set of documents, representing the analyst’s ‘normal’ workflow. 
New documents are then categorized as on- or off-topic based on their semantic simi-
larity to this Expected Model. The effectiveness of the solution is dependent on how 
well we can model expected communications, as well as on the accuracy of the cate-
gorization model and its generalizability to new documents. The most commonly 
used document representation has been the BOW [17, 18]. It has been shown that the 
knowledge of statistical distribution of terms in texts is sufficient to achieve high 
classification performance. However, in situations where the available training data is 
limited (as is frequently true in real-life applications), classification performance on 
BOW suffers. Our hypothesis is that the use of fewer, more discriminative linguistic 
features can outperform the traditional bag-of-words representation, particularly in 
the case of limited training data.  
The novelty of the proposed approach is in using linguistic features either ex-
tracted or assigned by our NLP-based system [19]. Such features include entities 
(nouns and noun phrases), named entities (proper names), and their semantic catego-
ries (i.e. PERSON, ORGANIZATION). Furthermore, the system can map these fea-
tures into higher-level concepts from external knowledge sources, particularly, those 
indicative of TOI and AOI. By utilizing these more abstract features, the system can 
produce document vectors that are well separated in the feature space.  
The NLP analysis is performed by TextTagger, a text processing system built at 
the Center for Natural Language Processing (CNLP)[20]. The system employs a part-
of-speech tagger and a sequence of rule-based shallow parsing phases that use lexico-
semantic and syntactic clues to identify and categorize entities, named entities, 
events, as well as relations among them. Next, individual topics and locations are 
mapped to appropriate categories from knowledge bases. The choice of knowledge 
bases was driven by the project context. Concept inference for TOI is supported by an 
ontology developed for the Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ (CNS)[21] collection 
of documents from the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) domain. For the concep-
tual organization of AOI, we utilize the SPAWAR Gazetteer [22]. Given that analysts 
usually operate on the country-level of AOI, the inference for geographical concepts 
is set to the ‘Country’ level, but other levels of granularity are possible. The entity 
and event extractions are output as frames, with relation extractions as frame slots. 
Figure 1 shows sample extractions for the named entity ‘Bavarian Liberation Army’ 
with inferred AOI (‘Country’) and TOI (‘CNS_Superclasses’). 
Authorities suspect the Bavarian Liberation Army, an extreme right-wing organi-
zation, may be responsible. 
 Bavarian Liberation Army 
  Country=Austria 
  CNS_Superclasses=Terrorist-Group 
Fig. 1. A sample extraction and concept inference. 
The NLP-extracted features are then used to generate document vectors for ma-
chine learning algorithms.  
5 Experimentation 
5.1 Experimentation Dataset 
Experiments were run on a subset of the larger Insider Threat collection created for 
the project. Its core comes from the CNS collection and covers such topics as WMD 
and Terrorism, and such genres as newswires, articles, analytic reports, international 
treaties, emails, and so on. Training and Testing document sets were drawn from the 
collection based on the project scenarios. These scenarios are synthetic datasets that 
represent the insiders’ workflow through atomic actions (e.g. ‘search database’, ‘open 
document’), some of which are associated with documents. The scenarios span a pe-
riod of six months each and include a baseline case (with no malicious activity) and 
six threat cases. The scenarios cover the workflow of hundreds of insiders with dif-
ferent work roles and tasks; for our experiments, we focused on one analyst from the 
Iraq/Biological Weapon shop. The above described Threat Scenario set the base for 
the Training and Testing datasets. 
The documents were retrieved in a manner simulating the analysts’ work: manu-
ally constructed task-specific queries (Figure 2) were run against the Insider Threat 
collection. Sets of such queries were also included in the Training and Testing data-
sets. 
 
(a) +UNMOVIC +inspect* +biolog* +Iraq* 
 
(b) +missile +test* North +Korea 
 
Fig. 2. Sample queries on topics of ‘Biological weapons program in Iraq’ (a) and ‘Missile pro-
gram in North Korea’ (b). 
Both sets included ‘noise’ (webpages on topics of general interest) as it is realistic 
to assume that, in the course of their workday, analysts may use the Web for personal 
reasons as well.  
Documents retrieved by the ‘North Korea’ queries were labeled as OFF-topic. All 
other documents were labeled as ON-topic, since, for the purposes of the project, it 
will suffice if the classifier distinguishes the ‘off-topic’ documents from the rest. The 
Training set contained only ON-topic documents, whereas the Testing set also in-
cluded OFF-topic documents. Table 1 shows the content and the volume of the result-
ing Training and Testing datasets. The relatively small share of OFF-topic documents 
in the Testing set (only 8.4%), though realistic given the context of the project, repre-
sented yet another challenge, as classification algorithms tend to favor more popu-
lated classes.  
Table 1. Training and Testing datasets.  
  Training Testing  
  ON (Iraq/Bio) ON (Iraq/Bio) OFF (NK/Missile) 
Documents 6382 3194 183 
Queries 461 222 135 
Total Class 6843 3416 318 
Total Set 6843  3734 
5.2 Classification experiments 
For classification experiments, we used an SVM classifier not only because it has 
been shown to outperform kNN, Naïve Bayes, and other classifiers on the Reuters 
Collection [23, 24], but also because it can handle one-class categorization problems 
as well. Experiments were run in LibSVM [25], modified to handle file names in the 
feature vectors, and to compute a confusion matrix for evaluation.  
We experimented with the following feature sets: 
1. Bag-of-words representation (BOW): each unique word in the document is used as 
a feature in the document vector.  
2. Categorized entities (CAT): only words identified as entities or named entities con-
stitute features in the document vector.  
3. TOI/AOI extractions (TOI/AOI): document vector includes only terms assigned as 
TOI/AOI indicators  
4. TOI/AOI extractions + important categories (TOI/AOI_cat): document vector uses 
TOI/AOI features (as in 3) plus all entities and named entities categorized as geo-
graphical or domain-relevant concepts (e.g. ‘WMD’, ‘missile’, ‘terrorism’) 
We applied stemming, a stop-word filter, and lower case conversion to all of the 
representations. The associated value for each term in the document representation is 
the frequency of the term in that document. The experiments reported herein were run 
with the linear kernel SVM, all parameters set to default. 
The results of the experiments can be represented in a confusion matrix (Table 2), 
where TrueON are documents correctly classified as ON-topic; FalseON are OFF-
topic documents assigned to the ON-topic class; TrueOFF are correctly detected 
OFF-topic documents, and FalseOFF are ON-topic documents misclassified into the 
OFF-topic class.  
 
 
Table 2. Confusion matrix. 
  True ON False ON True OFF False OFF 
BOW 2436 67 251 1070 
CAT 1954 80 238 1462 
AOI/TOI 1819 51 267 1597 
AOI/TOI_cat 2412 16 302 1004 
 
Classifier performance was assessed using standard metrics of precision and recall 
[26] and a weighted F-score, calculated for each class. Figure 3 shows sample formu-
las for precision on the ON-topic (1) and the recall of the OFF-topic (2) classes.  
TrueON 
Precision (ON) = 
TrueON + FalseON 
(1) 
TrueOFF 
Recall (OFF) = 
TrueOFF + FalseON
(2) 
Fig. 3. Sample formulas for Precision and Recall.  
In mainstream text categorization research, the performance focus is usually on the 
‘positive’ class, so the scores (precision, recall, F-measure) are often reported for this 
class only. The context of our project, however, gives much greater importance to de-
tecting the ‘negative’ (i.e. potentially malicious) cases, while keeping the rate of 
‘false alarms’ (FalseOFF) down. This provided a rather uncommon task for training 
the classifier: to aim not only for higher precision on ON-topic, but also for greater 
recall of OFF-topic. Therefore, in evaluating the classifier, we focused on the scores 
for the OFF-topic class, therefore, for the OFF-topic class, the F-measure was calcu-
lated with the weight β=10 (i.e. the Recall was weighted 10 times as important as 
Precision). The F-score for the ON-topic class was calculated using the standard 
weight β=1. Figure 4 shows the F-measure formula used. The actual value of β is not 
significant as long as it is greater than zero, since it places a higher emphasis on the 
precision than recall and F-score is not used to tune parameters of the learning algo-
rithm.  
(β+1) * Precision* Recall 
F-score = 
β*Precision + Recall 
(3) 
Fig. 4. Weighted F-score. 
The results (Table 3) demonstrate that, similarly to what was observed in experi-
ments with the regular SVM classifier [2], document representations using TOI/AOI 
features only (TOI/AOI) or in combination with domain-important categories 
(AOI/TOI_cat) improve the classifier performance over the baseline (BOW), while 
using many fewer features. In particular, AOI/TOI shows over 5% improvement in 
Recall (OFF) while using forty-nine times fewer features. Using a combination of 
AOI/TOI and category information (AOI/TOI_cat) achieves 16% improvement on 
Recall (OFF) and over 12% improvement on the weighted F-OFF over the baseline 
with nine times fewer features than BOW. 
Table 3. Experimental results. 
  Features 
Prec 
ON Rec ON 
F ON, 
β=1 
Prec 
OFF Rec OFF 
F OFF, 
β=10 
BOW 19774 97.22 68.68 80.50 19.0 78.93 61.34 
CAT 10682 96.07 57.20 71.71 14.0 74.84 53.65 
AOI/TOI 403 97.27 53.25 68.82 14.32 83.96 58.22 
AOI/TOI_cat 2149 99.34 70.61 82.55 23.12 94.97 74.05 
 
Although the decision to switch from the regular to the one-class SVM was guided 
by the context of our project, it was supported by the significantly higher perform-
ance of the one-class SVM on the OFF-topic class (Table 4). Regular SVM suffered 
from training on a weakly representative set for the OFF-topic class. Considering that 
the one-class SVM was able to achieve up to 94% of recall of ‘off-topic’ examples 
with no prior knowledge of what constitutes ‘off-topic’, the improvement is impres-
sive. The downside of such a high recall of the OFF-topic, however, was the deterio-
rated recall of the ON-topic. In other words, the one-class SVM errs in favor of the 
previously unknown ‘negative’ class, thus, causing ‘false alarms’. 
Table 4. Recall of the OFF-topic class: Regular vs. One-Class SVM. 
  Regular SVM One-Class SVM  
 Recall OFF F OFF, β=10 Recall OFF F OFF, β=10 
BOW 48.11 50.49 78.93 61.34 
CAT 27.0 28.92 74.84 53.65 
AOI/TOI 38.99 41.28 83.96 58.22 
AOI/TOI_cat 38.68 40.96 94.97 74.05 
 
Next, as in our experiments with the regular SVM [2], we wanted to assess how 
the one-class SVM will perform on a different ‘off-topic’ domain. We used the same 
Training set, and the ON-topic part of the Testing set. For the OFF- part of the Test-
ing set, the documents were retrieved from the Insider Threat dataset with queries on 
the topic of ‘China/Nuclear weapons’ (Table 5): 
Table 5. Testing dataset with OFF-topic documents drawn from the ‘China/Nuclear’ domain. 
Testing China/Nuclear 
 ON-topic (Iraq/Bio)  OFF-topic (China/Nuclear) 
Documents 3194 181 
Queries 222 129 
Total Class 3416 310 
Total Set 3726  
 
Experimental results (Tables 6 and 7) support the trend observed in the prior ex-
periments. One-class categorization on the NLP-enhanced document representations 
achieves superior performance, particularly on the ‘off-topic’ class, compared to the 
baseline (BOW). Besides, the domain change for the ‘off-topic’ documents does not 
seem to impact the classifier performance to a significant extent, which was the case 
with the regular SVM. Such robustness is quite reasonable, since the one-class SVM 
is not biased (via training) towards a particular kind of ‘negative’ data. 
Table 6. Confusion Matrix (OFF-topic documents drawn from the ‘China/Nuclear’ domain). 
  True ON False ON True OFF False OFF 
BOW 2346 134 176 1070 
CAT 1954 83 227 1462 
AOI/TOI 1819 96 214 1597 
AOI/TOI_cat 2412 79 231 1004 
Table 7. Experimental results (OFF-topic documents drawn from the ‘China/Nuclear’ domain). 
  Features 
Prec 
ON Rec ON 
F ON, 
β=1 
Prec 
OFF Rec OFF 
F OFF, 
β=10 
BOW 19774 94.60 68.68 79.58 14.13 56.77 44.55 
CAT 10682 95.93 57.20 71.67 13.44 73.23 52.14 
AOI/TOI 403 94.99 53.25 68.24 11.82 69.03 47.94 
AOI/TOI_cat 2149 96.83 70.61 81.67 18.70 74.52 58.61 
 
Overall, the results show that the one-class SVM performs impressively well, es-
pecially, on recall of the OFF-topic class. Another important point is that the algo-
rithm appears to be robust to handle different subject domains of ‘negative’ examples. 
We believe, therefore, that it can be effectively applied to categorization problems 
where only ‘positive’ examples are available. The results also demonstrate that the 
use of NLP-based features achieves better performance in categorization while using 
many fewer features than the commonly used bag-of-words representation.  
6 Conclusion and directions for future research 
The experiments described herein show that leveraging one-class SVM with the NLP-
extracted features for document representation improves classification effectiveness 
and efficiency. In future research we will seek to evaluate the impact of different 
combinations of linguistic features, extractions from text, and concepts inferred from 
external knowledge bases on categorization accuracy. In addition, to further explore 
the robustness of the one-class classifier, we plan to test it on a combination of differ-
ent subject domains for the ‘off-topic’ class. 
The one-class approach fits particularly well the situations where it is not feasible 
to provide ‘atypical’ examples. Overall, the research reported herein holds potential 
for providing the IC with the analytic tools to recognize anomalous insider activity; as 
well as to build content profiles of vast document collections when applied in a 
broader context.  
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